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China’s Cyber Initiatives Counter International Pressure
Abstract
Prior to its historic 2015 “no hack” pact for commercial advantage with the United States,
Beijing has been engaged drafting and passing legislation, most with specific cyber
components, to enhance its security posture while protecting its economic interests. This
approach is in stark contrast to United States efforts that have demonstrated a focus on
“acting globally, thinking locally” philosophy wherein most of its cyber efforts have been
outwardly facing and are distinct from other security considerations. This paper suggests
that by strengthening its domestic front with a legal framework, Beijing is preparing itself
to counter any foreign initiative contrary to Beijing’s plans (e.g., cyber norms of behavior,
cyber sanctions, etc.) by being able to exert legal measures against foreign interests in
country, thereby preserving its cyber sovereignty.
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Introduction
During the period where the United States threatened to impose cyber
sanctions against China for suspected industrial espionage, Beijing has been
busy drafting and passing internal legislation to enhance its security posture
while protecting its economic interests. Many critics of this series of draft
legislation, particular its draft Cybersecurity Law, believe that China is
seeking to increase its control over domestic Internet activity and the
information traversing it, or using its strict mandates to protect Chinese
businesses from foreign competition. One interpretation of the aggressive
initiatives undertaken by Beijing is that they reflect an “acting locally,
thinking globally” approach to China’s security situation, intentionally
integrating cybersecurity into all facets of its national strategy. The result is
that Beijing is guaranteeing its self-described right of cyber sovereignty, a
term that remains contested in the international community. Internet
security is a national priority due to its interconnected nature with China’s
informatization strategy, the national-level plan to modernize all facets of
China’s society. Indeed, the comprehensive nature of China’s recently
enacted National Security law suggests that Beijing is positioning itself for
greater resiliency in the face of exterior influence and pressure in an attempt
to mitigate and lessen potential economic and/or diplomatic liabilities
imposed by the West.

Definitions
For the purpose of this article, the following definitions are applied.
Cyber sovereignty. In December 2015, Xi Jinping referred a nation’s right to
choose how to develop and regulate their Internet.1 In this vein, cyber
sovereignty reflects the stance that cyberspace should be defined and ruled by
state boundaries.2
Cyberspace. The environment formed by physical and nonphysical
components, characterized by the use of computers and the electro-magnetic
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data using computer networks.3
“China Internet: Xi Jinping Calls for Cyber Sovereignty,” BBC News, December 16, 2015,
available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35109453.
2 John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese
Information Operations,” China’s Evolving Military Strategy (Washington, DC: April
2016).
3 The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, March 28,
2013, available at:
1
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Information security. China does not use the word cyber and prefers the
term information security as it includes the mental aspects of information as
well as the technology on which it is processed and shared.4

China and Information Security
The fundamental difference between how China and the United States view
cyberspace is clear in their respective interpretations on what constitutes
cyber security. While the United States maintains a technological view of
cyberspace, China is more holistic in its perception taking into account not
only the technology that facilitates communications, but also the actual data
that traverses or is stored on it.5 This all-inclusive perception is essential in
understanding how China approaches its own security. In February 2014,
Chinese President Xi Jinping said that there was no national security without
cyber security.6 The fact that the two have mutual reliance not only highlights
China’s understanding of the connective nature of networks, but that equally,
if not more important, that data and information are the true drivers for
creating a secure environment.
Rarely do actors exploit networks for its own sake (although in times of
conflict networks may be the targets for disruption or destruction); rather, as
the volume of global cyber espionage activity suggests it is the information the
network possesses that is valuable, whether it is to a country, a foreign
government, or non-state actors. Indeed, China is well aware of the influence
potential that information can have, particularly about inciting dissent in a
country. China’s leaders saw the Color Revolutions as illegitimate actions that
removed standing powers, significantly helped by raging domestic grievances,
electoral politics exploited by the opposition, and Western powers’
intervention for geo-strategic interest.7 The Chinese government sees its
role as a holistic enabler supporting the protection and development of
https://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinnmanual?layout=http://skin.issuu.com/v/
light/layout.xml&showFlipBtn=true&e=5903855/1802381.
4 Keir Giles and William Hagestad, “Divided by a Common Language: Cyber Definitions
in Chinese, English, and Russian,” 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict,
available at: https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2013proceedings/d3r1s1_giles.pdf.
5 Ibid.
6 “President Xi Jinping’s Views on the Internet,” China Daily, December 14, 2015,
available at: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201512/14/content_22706983_3.htm.
7 Titus C. Chen, “China’s Reaction to the Colored Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism
in Full Swing,” National Chengchi University (NCCU)–Institute of International
Relations, 2010, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1644372.
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economic and social initiatives through its series of strategic national Five
Year Plans. Due to important part that cyberspace—both the technology
as well as the information traversing it—plays in driving economic
prosperity and promoting social harmony, it’s easy to see why China
believes that focusing solely on the infrastructure is too limiting, and does
not take into account a country’s security and development as well as its
people’s life and work.”8 Therefore, without willing to make concessions, it
comes as little surprise that the two governments have thus far failed to make
significant progress in trying to establish norms of behavior in cyberspace, or
come to consensus on what constitutes cybersecurity. A mid-September 2015
meeting between Chinese and U.S. officials made headway on this issue, but
as of this writing, there remains a fundamental area of disagreement on some
important tenets.
Similar to other governments, the issue of cybersecurity has become a major
concern for Beijing that has resulted in new agencies being created as well as
new legislation being put forth in order to consolidate cybersecurity efforts.
This is a vital national imperative for China, a fact evidenced by everincreasing efforts to control information in country. While trying to increase
indigenous production of information technology to reduce reliance on
foreign products, China maintains two objectives whose missions ultimately
serve the same purpose: preserving the Chinese Communist Party in power.

Key Government Security Initiatives with Cyber Implications
China co-sponsored two proposals for an international code of conduct for
nation state use of information and telecommunication technologies–the first
presented before the United Nations in 2011, and a revised version in 2015—
that have essentially made little headway.9 In both, China appears to have
focused on information security-related initiatives whose outcomes it can
control and that directly support China’s interests domestically. One of the
William Wan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Takes Charge of New Cyber Effort,” The
Washington Post, February 27, 2014, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-president-takes-charge-of-newcyber-effort/2014/02/27/a4bffaac-9fc9-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html.
9 Letter dated September 12, 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the
Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, A//66/359/, September 9, 2011, available at:
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-110912-CodeOfConduct_0.pdf;
Letter dated January 9, 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, A//69/723/, January 13, 2015, available at:
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf.
8
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first key initiatives instituted was the 2014 establishment of a Xi Jinping-led
national-level Internet security-leading group to provide critical policy
guidance for Internet-related activities in China.
The second initiative is a series of legislation each focusing on areas of
national security concerns, each composed of Information security
components. Critics view much of this new legislation as China exerting
protectionism in order to deter competition while promoting its own
companies. However, when viewed through a holistic security prism, the two
are not mutually exclusive and if economic development is a Chinese national
priority, ensuring that those companies viewed as integral to supporting or
driving the country’s economic progress is a national security priority, and
will likely be supported by government activities. 10 During his September
2015 to the United States, Xi Jinping commented, “We will continue to build
a law-based business environment” emphasizing an almost quid-pro-quo
relationship. China will continue to open up its marketplace as long as the
United States reduces its limits on what American companies can sell in
China as well as a “level playing field” for Chinese investment in the United
States.11
China’s recently drafted legislation covers a diverse spectrum of economic and
security concerns to include national security, non-governmental
organizations, anti-terrorism, and cyber security. However, it is noteworthy
that technology and its proper use was a component in much of this
legislation, establishing a baseline and providing China a legal means to
identify and mitigate any behavior outside what it deems acceptable.
Alternatively, it reaffirms China’s right to dictate the regulation of its
cyberspace and provides China the legal justification to do so. Not only does
this reaffirm Xi’s acknowledgement that without cybersecurity there is no
national security, but with the inclusion of such mandates Beijing is subtly
guaranteeing its rights for cyber sovereignty, a term that it first introduced in
its 2010 white article, “The Internet in China.”12
Eswar Prasad, “China’s Approach to Economic Development and Industrial Policy,”
Brookings Institution, June 15, 2011, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/06/15-china-economicdevelopment-prasad.
11 Todd C. Frankel, “China’s President Promises to Open Doors to U.S. Businesses,” The
Washington Post, September 23, 2015, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-president-pledges-toopen-doors-to-us-businesses/2015/09/23/298d24e0-94d6-4064-930ab21578916b8d_story.html.
12 Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Sovereign Internet,” The Diplomat, June 24, 2014, available
at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/.
10
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Creation of the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading
Group
While the Chinese government bureaucratic hierarchy resembles that of other
governments, leading small groups composed of senior influential officials
drive important policy decisions. Leading groups, which rarely announce
their meetings or disclose their full membership, cover everything from
economics to propaganda working out policy decisions long before the party
receives them.13 According to the director of a Chinese policy institute, small
groups rather than government ministries decide important policy matters.14
In February 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed charge of a new
Central Committee leading group overseeing Chinese Internet security, the
Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group. State-run
CCTV outlined several goals of the group, including the drafting of a
comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy and coordination of
cybersecurity across sectors. According to CCTV, Xi tied the importance of
government work on securing the Internet to long-term priorities, such as
maintaining control over public opinion in China.15
Additionally, according to Chinese news sources, this leading group is to
deepen reform, protect national security, safeguard national interests, and
promote the development of information technology. The group will have
complete authority over online activities, including economic, political,
cultural, social, and military. 16 The leading group’s close relationship to
China’s State Council, the chief administrative authority of the country,
enables rapid implementation of guidelines and laws.17

Cary Huang, “How Leading Small Groups Help Xi Jinping and other Party Leaders
Exert Power,” South China Morning Post, September 14, 2014, available at:
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1409118/how-leading-small-groups-helpxi-jinping-and-other-party-leaders-exert.
14 Ibid.
15 William Wan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Takes Charge of New Cyber Effort,” The
Washington Post, February 27, 2014, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-president-takes-charge-of-newcyber-effort/2014/02/27/a4bffaac-9fc9-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html.
16 “Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization Established,” China
Copyright and Media, March 13, 2014, available at:
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/03/01/central-leading-groupfor-internet-security-and-informatization-established/.
17 “China Monitor,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2014, available at:
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/ChinaMonitor/China_Monitor_No_20_eng.pdf.
13
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The leading group’s membership demonstrates China’s commitment in
raising cybersecurity to the national level, providing a decision-making
authority. The senior-level membership to include the President and the
Premier reflect Beijing’s direct involvement in the creation and
implementation of future cyber policy for the country. Indeed, China
designed its “Outline of National IT Development Strategy” to guide the
country’s IT development for the next decade and position China to become
an Internet power by 2050. 18

Passing the 2016 “Cyber Security” Law
In November 2016, the Chinese government approved its “Cyber Security”
Law, which addresses the security of key Internet and information systems
and data,19 as well as increasing the government’s powers to record and
impede the dissemination of information it deemed illegal.20 Introduced by
the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC), an organization created in
2014 to consolidate control over cybersecurity, the law is set to go into effect
in June 2017.21 Per the law, government agencies would issue additional
guidelines for network security in "critical industries" such as telecoms,
energy, transport, finance, national defense and military matters, and
government administration, according to a news source.22 Agencies and
enterprises will be compelled to improve their ability to defend against
network intrusions while demanding security reviews for equipment and
data.23 The government will adopt priority protection over key information
infrastructure that seriously jeopardizes national security and the public

“China Eyes World Class Cyber Multi-Nationals,” Xinhua, July 27, 2016, available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/27/c_135544563.htm; Mandy Zuo, “China
Aims to Become Internet Superpower by 2050,” South China Morning Post, July 28,
2016, available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1995936/china-aims-become-internet-cyberpower-2020.
19 “China Passes New National Security Law Extending Control over the Internet,” The
Guardian, July 1, 2015, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/01/china-national-security-lawinternet-regulation-cyberspace-xi-jinping.
20 Gerry Shih, “China Draft Cyber Security Law Could up Censorship, Irk Business,”
Reuters, July 8, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/uschina-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0PI09020150708.
21 Josh Chin and Eva Dou, “China’s New Cybersecurity Law Rattles Foreign Tech Firms,”
Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2016 available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-approves-cybersecurity-law-1478491064.
22 Gerry Shih, “China Draft Cyber Security Law Could up Censorship, Irk Business,”
Reuters, July 8, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/uschina-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0PI09020150708.
23 Chin and Dou, “China’s New Cybersecurity Law.”
18
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interest, particularly in the event of damaged or leaked data.24 According to
one Chinese media outlet, the law safeguards sovereignty on cyberspace,
national security, and the rights of citizens.25
Internationally, the law faces much trepidation. Critics believe that such a bill
would further protect China products, conveying that such legislation could
make it difficult for countries that rely on competition to bolster their
economic interests.26 Other critics cite the provisions of making censorship a
matter of cybersecurity, which ultimately would allow the government to
punish those companies that allow unapproved online publication of
information online.27 Certainly, the fact that the law requires information
produced in China to remain in China can make it difficult for foreign
vendors, particularly of tech equipment, considering that all network
equipment must meet Chinese government approval prior to deployment.28
However, some see the law as bolstering the security of the domestic
population. As one source points out, most of the privacy enhancements
benefiting Chinese citizens (to include access, data retention, breach
notification, mobile privacy, online fraud, and protection of minors) align
with those required in the European Union.29
The urgency of this law reflects Beijing’s prioritization of the use of the
Internet particularly as it applies to its national security, which may be the
reason why many of the same issues feature prominently in both the national
security law and the new cybersecurity law. There are two key reoccurring
themes: 1) the ability to monitor and control information, and 2) the
compliance of foreign enterprises with the rules set forth. Both have been
cited by critics as being efforts of the government to tighten its control on civil
“Second Reading of China’s Draft of Cybersecurity Law,” Lexology, June 30, 2016,
available at: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eaac6bbd-12ab-445996cd-ba42a2cee007.
25 “Xinhua Insight: China adopts cybersecurity law to protect national security, citizens'
rights,” Xinhua.net, November 7, 2016, available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-11/07/c_135812209.htm.
26 Katie Nelson, “China’s Cybersecurity Law–Trouble for Businesses,” The Washington
Examiner, September 8, 2015, available at:
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-trouble-forbusinesses/article/2571314.
27 Chin and Dou, “China’s New Cybersecurity Law.”
28 Jonathan Vanian, “How China’s Proposed Cybersecurity Law Could Impact Tech
Companies,” Fortune, July 8, 2015, available at: http://fortune.com/2015/07/08/chinasproposed-cybersecurity-law-impact-tech-companies/.
29 Patrick Burke, “China: Carpe Datum Law Blog China Finalizes Cyber Security Law,”
Mondaq, December 8, 2016, available at:
http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/551194/Security/Carpe+Datum+Law+Blog+China
+Finalizes+New+Cyber+Security+Law.
24
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society while making unreasonable demands on foreign businesses,30
particularly as it empowers the government to oversee the hardware and
software holding the data of foreign companies, as well as look inside at the
data.31 On December 27, CAC published a strategy document that laid out the
framework for the new cybersecurity law in which it reiterated the need for
increased scrutiny of local and foreign technology used in industries deemed
critical to the national interest.32 While such a mandate may appear
draconian, it does align China’s strategic security interests with most other
nation states, particularly concerning security critical infrastructure.
However, perhaps creating the most uneasiness is the vagueness surrounding
the language of the law and the details surrounding how the government
intends to monitor compliance, leaving such interpretation up to the
authorities in charge. Such broad considerations enable China to implement
a case-by-case approach, allowing it to scrutinize the business practices of the
companies, as well as any perceived or real government association, to
influence and inform decision-making. In such instances, such legal
ambiguity provides China the means to implement penalties as a warning or a
retaliatory action to perceived threats against Chinese economic and/or
political interests.

Passing the 2016 Overseas Non-Government Organization Management
Law
The law is designed to standardize foreign non-governmental office (NGO)
operations in order to promote “exchange and cooperation” while outlining
permissible and non-permissible activities.33 All NGOs would be required to
get approval from a Chinese supervisory unit before it can operate in China,
banning those that do not receive such authorization.34 It further prohibits
any Chinese organization from conducting activities on behalf of or with non-

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chilling Effect of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime,
Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/chinanew-cybersecurity-law-internet-security/.
31 Burke, “China: Carpe Datum Law.”
32 Cate Cadell, “China Renews Calls for Tighter Cyber Space Security – CAC,” Reuters,
December 27, 2016, available at: http://news.trust.org/item/20161227071926-di2or/.
33 Jared Genser and Julia Kuperminc, “China’s Proposed Non-Governmental
Organization Law: Cooperation or Coercion?” The Diplomat, July 2, 2015, available at:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/chinas-proposed-non-governmental-organizationlaw-cooperation-or-coercion/.
34 Edward Wong, “Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations,” The New
York Times, April 28, 2016, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html.
30
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authorized NGOs.35 Critics are pressing Beijing to revise the current draft due
to concerns that the law would greatly influence Chinese civil society,
restricting freedoms, and tightening control of expression within China.36
Like the National Security and draft Cybersecurity law, the NGO law is
nebulous concerning definitions affording Beijing considerable grey area in
which to operate. For example, identifying criteria for what constitutes an
NGO is unclear and possibly ranges from a foreign professor visiting China to
an artistic dance troupe.37 Additionally worrisome is that the law forbids
political activities without clarifying activity classification or providing the
evaluation criteria informing this determination.38 While the law is not
specifically cyber-related, it is safe to assume that NGOs that properly register
with Chinese authorities would be required to comply with any acceptable
technology use policies set forth by the Chinese government in other
legislation.

Passing the 2015 National Security Law
On July 1, 2015, China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress adopted a new National Security Law, largely considered China’s
most comprehensive national security legislation. According to one U.S. law
firm specializing in international national security matters, the main function
of the law is to provide a framework for China’s security considerations in the
face of emerging threats; however, overlapping security considerations in
many areas demonstrate Beijing’s perspective that national security is an
inherently integrated process, creating “a national security path with Chinese
characteristics.”39 The law breaks down into the following seven chapters:
•
•

Guiding principles for national security
Defining national security across multiple areas (e.g., cultural,
economic, and military security)

“China: The Draft Overseas NGO Management Law Must be Substantially Revised,”
FIDH, June 3, 2015, available at: https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-forHuman-Rights/asia/china/china-the-draft-overseas-ngo-management-law-must-besubstantially.
36 Sui-Lee Wee, Michael Martina, and James Pomfret, “Foreign Governments, NonProfits Press China to Revise NGO Law,” Reuters, June 1, 2015, available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/01/us-china-ngosidUSKBN0OH2I720150601.
37 Ibid.
38 Genser and Kuperminc, “China’s Proposed Non-Governmental Organization Law.”
39 Zunou Zhou, “China’s Draft Counter-Terrorism Law,” Jamestown Foundation, July 17,
2015, available at:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44173
&cHash=dc00eedd4c61b21c691b9700b1468049#.VfwKd3szAZQ.
35
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•
•
•
•
•

Functions and responsibilities of the National People’s Congress
Key elements of the national security regime (e.g., intelligence
collection, states of emergency)
Allocating resources to national security work
Obligations of citizens and corporations to national security
Supplementary provisions40

Perhaps most notably, however, is that the law is not restrictive to China’s
borders. Included in China’s territorial sovereignty includes the polar beds,
outer space, and cyberspace, a much wider aperture than narrower
perspectives on national security that focus more on defense.41 This should
come as little surprise given Beijing’s continued advocacy for a state’s right of
territorial sovereignty, particularly in areas such as cyberspace and outer
space. With cyberspace, China views information as well as information
systems in the same context, intimating that information even outside China’s
borders is a potential threat to its national security interests. 42
Critics of the new law cite two major concerns about the legislation’s wording
and implication. The first is that the law is widely seen as Beijing’s
commitment to increasing its monitoring and control of internal dissent,
while government officials view it as a necessary tool to address new and
emerging threats such as cybercrime and terrorism.43 Many believe that
China cracks down on opposition, a capability greatly enhanced by the broad
powers imparted to authorities under the current wording of the new law.
One major criticism is that the stated provisions are vague, lacking the
necessary details to provide a more concrete understanding of what is
acceptable and where the line is drawn and what are acceptable
repercussions. Such ambiguity appears left up to the discretion and
interpretation of authorities providing them a wide berth from which to
operate.
“China Enacts New National Security Law,” Covington, July 2, 2015, available at:
https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/06/china_passes_n
ew_national_security_law.pdf.
41 “China’s New National Security Law Creates More Insecurity for Foreign Businesses,”
Hogan Lovells, July 2015, available at:
https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/chinas-new-national-security-lawcreates-more-insecurity-for-foreign-businesses.
42 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chilling Effect of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime,
Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/chinanew-cybersecurity-law-internet-security/.
43 Chun Han Wong, “China Adopts Sweeping National-Security Law,” The Wall Street
Journal, July 1, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-adoptssweeping-national-security-law-1435757589.
40
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The second concern is that the law’s focus on foreign technology products and
services is a move to promote Chinese companies over foreign competitors.
Core network technology, critical infrastructure, and information systems and
data in key areas are to be stored securely and be controllable.44
Unsurprisingly, this is garnering much concern from foreign companies that
would fall under these requirements under Article 59, which focuses on
national security review and monitoring “foreign investment that infringes
upon or may infringe upon national security.”45 This may result in serious
implications for foreign suppliers of such equipment and/or services, such as
the imposition of higher costs or scrutiny than their Chinese counterparts.
If the national security law is the foundation from which its subsequent draft
legislation has emerged, China’s May 2015 Military Strategy is the
underpinning for many of these sovereignty themes. The strategy emphasizes
China’s national security situation against a world of complex threats, taking
the opportunity to address specifically space and cyberspace as the new
commanding heights in strategic competition.46 Indeed, China’s national
level policy reinforces messaging that addresses China’s peaceful rise in a
time of increasing and diverse threats making integrated security planning an
essential counterweight.

Passing the 2015 Anti-Terror Law
In December 2015, China passed a new “anti-terror law” that compels
technology companies to help decrypt information giving Chinese authorities
access to encrypted data.47 The law combined administrative, judicial, and
military means to address Chinese anti-terrorism efforts, demonstrating a
comprehensiveness that reflects Beijing’s desire to integrate all facets of
security under the umbrella of its new national security law. The law
reinforces tenets seen in the other draft legislation: aspects of information
control, organizational monitoring, technology compliance, and collaboration
with Chinese authorities in the name of security. For example, the proposed
“China’s New National Security Law Creates More Insecurity.”
“China Enacts New National Security Law.”
46 Caitlin Campbell, “Highlights from China’s New Defense White Paper, ‘China’s Military
Strategy,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 1, 2015 available
at:
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20Brief_Highlights%2
0from%20Chinas%20New%20Defense%20White%20Paper_Campbell_6.1.15.pdf.
47 “China Passes Anti-Terror Law with Controversial Cyber Provisions,” Reuters,
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law would also require companies to keep also servers and user data
within China, supply law enforcement authorities with communications
records and censor terrorism-related Internet content.48 In the face of
mounting pressure, China ultimately amended some of the initial provisions
that would have mandated technology companies to provide backdoor access
for Chinese authorities’ remote access. Ultimately, the final enacted law did
not include these provisions.49

Developing and Using IT Standards
While China pushes forward its legislative agenda, it also approaches its
security from technological perspective where it continually seeks ways to
reduce dependence on foreign technologies. One approach toward this end is
the development of alternative standards to help boost their own companies.
National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden’s disclosures
of alleged collusion between U.S. technology firms and the NSA only
magnified China’s fears of foreign technology resulting in China removing
some U.S. companies from government-approved purchase lists.50 The
following are some initiatives that China has embarked upon to reach this
objective.
•

China’s Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS): First introduced in
2007, China’s MLPS protects Chinese national security, although
detractors believe it also serves to protect Chinese industry from
international competition.51 The MLPS has a five-level risk-based
classification to identify and protect those systems that are critical for
national security and the economy (Level 3 and above).52 In concert

Michael Martina, “China Says Deliberation on Draft Anti-Terrorism Law Goes Ahead,”
Reuters, March 17, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/17/uschina-security-idUSKBN0MD12X20150317.
49 Glyn Moody, “China’s New Anti-Terror Law: No Backdoors, but Decryption on
Demand,” Ars Technica, December 29, 2015, available at: http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/12/chinas-new-anti-terror-law-copies-uk-no-backdoors-but-decryptionon-demand/.
50 Scott Cendrowski, “Why China Is Making Life Miserable for Big U.S. Tech,” Forbes,
February 26, 2015, available at: http://fortune.com/2015/02/26/why-china-is-makinglife-miserable-for-big-u-s-tech/.
51 Nathaniel Ahrens, “National Security and China’s Information Security Standards,”
Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 8, 2012, available at:
http://csis.org/publication/national-security-and-chinas-information-securitystandards.
52 Jing de Jong-Chen, “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations: Understanding China’s
Current Environment,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, September 15,
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with the MLPS strategy, China has ventured forth in trying to develop
alternative standards to compete with Western-led standardization
efforts. Some of these include:
•

WAPI: China was working to adopt Wireless LAN
Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) as a
mandatory security measure for any wireless product sold in
China. However, after objections from the U.S. government
and other IT companies, it suspended efforts in 2014.53

•

Payments Standard: Additionally, in June 2015, China
implemented a payments standard requiring all bank cards
issued in China to comply with a technical standard known as
PBOC 3.0. The new standard would force companies like
MasterCard and Visa to adopt the new standard at a significant
cost. While cited as a security concern, detractors assert that
China is using this standard as an “unnecessary barrier to
trade.”54

Legal Warfare–Prepping for Future Conflict
Viewed through the prism of legal warfare, the onslaught of draft legislation
bolsters China’s strategy to exploit domestic and international laws in order to
achieve the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests.55 At its core, before
the onset of actual formal hostilities and continuing after their conclusion, the
strategic goal of legal warfare provides pre-conflict justification and postconflict legal resolution.56
Passed legislation focuses on areas that not only improve Chinese security,
but also provide the legal justification for Chinese authorities to act in any
manner they determine is appropriate. The ambiguity inherent in each draft
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2013, available at: https://cryptome.org/2014/06/prc-three-wars.pdf.
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Foundation, May 21, 2012, available at:
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bill allows operational freedom for the government allowing it to determine
criminal acts and corresponding consequences to their offenses.
When viewing requirements placed on foreign interests in China, failure to
comply provides the government a legal avenue to pursue repercussions. The
legal nebulousness provides China the wiggle room to pursue other means of
resolution to safeguard its interests in other political, diplomatic, or economic
areas. For example, should the United States ultimately levy cyber sanctions
against China for their espionage activities, China is able to look at U.S.
companies in China and find the legal means with which to impose fines or
expel them from business from China as a retaliatory action that is backed by
the legal grounds the government has established. The fact that businesses
have to agree to these rules in order to do business in China means that they
acknowledged and understood the laws previously giving them little recourse
to appealing the matter.

Acting Locally–What Does It Mean for China?
By acting locally about implementing cybersecurity in all of its legislation,
China is legally guaranteeing its rights as a cyber sovereign, thereby providing
the justification to mitigate direct threats to its national security via the
information space. The fact that Beijing views its national security as a closely
interwoven tapestry of concerns with information security as its unifying
thread suggests that it will continue to view “cyber” security from a holistic
perspective, and not just a technical one and not just a technical one
disconnected from the data it protects. Overlapping rules ultimately offer the
government plenty of opportunities to target individuals/organizations under
various statutes, thereby providing it a diverse and flexible platform from
which to respond to any perceived hostile infractions to China’s information
space. They also offer Beijing a retaliatory mechanism for incurred penalties
like cyber sanctions that levied against Chinese interests.
Termed “protectionist” by critics, these legislative initiatives accomplish the
goal of strengthening China’s strategic security interests (which include
regime power continuity, sustaining economic growth, domestic stability,
defending national and territorial sovereignty, and reacquiring regional
preeminence).57 Therefore, when governments admonish Beijing for
“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,”
Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at:
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Re
port.pdf.
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supporting its commercial sector via government requirements that restrain
foreign businesses in country, Beijing can leverage these laws to support these
same national security interests. The same principle extends to conducting
cyber espionage for intellectual property for that matter, as long as it does not
conflict with the principles set forth in the 2015 China-U.S. “no hacking for
commercial gain” agreement.
“Acting locally” via recent legislation enables China to address better its
strategic security objectives by positioning China to be able to mitigate
potential fallout from those situations that could negatively affect China’s
interests. Some of these include but are not limited to the following:
•

A Chinese Color Revolution: Beijing is acutely aware of the successes
the various Color Revolutions had on regime change in their respective
countries. Beijing has survived similar scares in the past: The 1989
Tiananmen Square student-led protests called for press and speech
freedoms. The protests culminated in a million people gathering at its
height and required military intervention to quell it.58 In 2014,
authorities ultimately put down Hong Kong’s pro-democratic “Occupy
Central” protesters after two months of protesting.59 Monitoring and
controlling information venues, as well as any NGO in country,
certainly mitigates the opportunities for harmful information to work
its way into the public domain.

•

Non-China Friendly Cyber Norms of Behavior: While there is not a
currently an accepted international cyber, code of conduct, both the
United States and China and Russia have been promoting their own
visions of what such an agreement should encompass. Should the
global consensus favor the model advocated by the United States and
Western interests, Beijing can enforce the standards set forth by this
series of legislation as they dictate the rule of conduct for organizations
in its sovereign territory.

Conclusion
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China’s new legislation comes at a time when Beijing is actively seeking to
improve its security posture, while concurrently trying to preserve its vital
interests, particularly an economy which had experienced substantial growth
but has since slowed down considerably in 2015.60 The series of draft
legislation focuses internally and in several cases contain overlapping
regulations designed to enforce the same rules. Vague language and lack of
clear criteria will ultimately benefit the Chinese who will be able to use their
own judgment in reviewing potential infractions on a case-by-case basis,
allowing them to levy punishment per their assignment of value (and perhaps
influenced by geopolitical matters).
China’s belief that information security integrates with other security
disciplines demonstrates its commitment to addressing its acknowledged
weaknesses in the digital domain. The establishment of a national-level
leading group whose mission is to protect national security, safeguard
national interests, and promote the development of information technology,
underscores this undertaking.61 The close relationship with the leading group
and the State Council further shows that such collaboration better ensures the
rapid implementation of guidelines and laws. 62 The onslaught of draft
legislation and the prompt enactment of its new National Security Law are
indicative of the success of this collaboration.
It is too early to tell if China will push the seemingly restrictive parameters of
their recent legislation drafts, are temper them more in order to assuage
foreign concerns. The result of Xi’s 2015 state visit and political/economic
responses to alleged Chinese cyber activity, as well as other geopolitical
hotspots such as South China Sea disputes will likely influence the ultimate
verbiage, passage, and enforcement of these laws. Based on previous history,
Beijing will likely wait, watch, and act accordingly.
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